QtPass 1.4.0
Multi-platform GUI for pass, the standard unix password manager.
|
QtPass is a GUI for pass, the standard unix password manager.
pass
or git
and gpg2
directlyLogo based on Heart-padlock by AnonMoos.
OpenSUSE & Fedora yum install qtpass
dnf install qtpass
Debian, Ubuntu and derivates like Mint, Kali & Raspbian apt-get install qtpass
Arch Linux pacman -S qtpass
Gentoo emerge -atv qtpass
Sabayon equo install qtpass
FreeBSD pkg install qtpass
macOS brew install --cask qtpass
Windows choco install qtpass
At runtime the only real dependency is gpg2
but to make the most of it, you'll need git
and pass
too.
Your GPG has to be set-up with a graphical pinentry when applicable, same goes for git authentication. On Mac macOS this currently seems to only work best with pinentry-mac
from homebrew, although gpgtools works too.
On most unix systems all you need is:
Profiles allow to group passwords. Each profile might use a different git repository and/or different gpg key. Each profile also can be associated with a pass store singing key to verify the detached .gpg-id signature. A typical use case is to separate personal and work passwords.
Hint
Instead of using different git repositories for the various profiles passwords could be synchronized with different branches from the same repository. Just clone the repository into the profile folders and checkout the related branch.
The following commands set up two profile folders:
Note:
[personal GnuPG-ID]
and [work GnuPG-ID]
with the ID from the related GnuPG key.echo ... >> .gitignore
are just needed in case there is a git repository present in the base directory.Once the repositories and GnuPG-ID's have been defined the profiles can be set up in QtPass.
This is done with make check
Codecoverage can be done with make lcov
, make gcov
, make coveralls
and/or make codecov
.
Be sure to first run: make distclean && qmake CONFIG+=coverage qtpass.pro
Using this program will not magically keep your passwords secure against compromised computers even if you use it in combination with a smartcard.
It does protect future and changed passwords though against anyone with access to your password store only but not your keys. Used with a smartcard it also protects against anyone just monitoring/copying all files/keystrokes on that machine and such an attacker would only gain access to the passwords you actually use. Once you plug in your smartcard and enter your PIN (or due to CVE-2015-3298 even without your PIN) all your passwords available to the machine can be decrypted by it, if there is malicious software targeted specifically against it installed (or at least one that knows how to use a smartcard).
To get better protection out of use with a smartcard even against a targeted attack I can think of at least two options:
FAQ and CONTRIBUTING documentation. CHANGELOG
Site Source code Issue queue Chat