QtPass 1.2.1

QtPass is a multi-platform GUI for pass, the standard unix password manager.

View the Project on GitHub IJHack/qtpass

QtPass MainWindow

Insecure Password Generation prior to 1.2.1

All passwords generated with QtPass' built-in password generator prior to 1.2.1 are possibly predictable and enumerable by hackers.
The generator used libc's random(), seeded with srand(msecs), where msecs is not the msecs since 1970 (not that that'd be secure anyway), but rather the msecs since the last second. This means there are only 1000 different sequences of generated passwords.

Read more about this issue on Github.
Please note that this is an issue with the QtPass GUI and not in pass or the greater password-store ecosystem.

We advice to update to 1.2.1 as soon as possible and change any password you may have generated with the QtPass' password generator.

The current master branch has a proposed fix.
As soon as a new release is available, we'll update the information on this page.


Read the changelog for the latest features and fixes.




pacman -S qtpass

OpenSUSE & Fedora

yum install qtpass
dnf install qtpass

Debian, Ubuntu and derivates like Kali & Raspbian

apt-get install qtpass


emerge -atv qtpass


pkg install qtpass
cd /usr/ports/sysutils/qtpass/ && make install clean

More options


Latest stable on the releases page, latest build via AppVeyor.

Via Chocolatey
choco install qtpass


Latest stable on the releases page, latest build via AnneJan.

Via Homebrew Cask
brew cask install qtpass


On most *nix systems all you need is:

qmake && make && make install

On Mac OS X:

brew install qt5
brew link --overwrite --force qt5
xcode-select --install
qmake && make && macdeployqt QtPass.app

Currently seems to only work with MacGPG2

Security considerations

Using this program will not magically keep your passwords secure against compromised computers even if you use it in combination with a smartcard.

It does protect future and changed passwords though against anyone with access to your password store only but not your keys. Used with a smartcard it also protects against anyone just monitoring/copying all files/keystrokes on that machine and such an attacker would only gain access to the passwords you actually use. Once you plug in your smartcard and enter your PIN (or due to CVE-2015-3298 even without your PIN) all your passwords available to the machine can be decrypted by it, if there is malicious software targeted specifically against it installed (or at least one that knows how to use a smartcard).

To get better protection out of use with a smartcard even against a targeted attack I can think of at least two options:

Planned features

Known issues


Can't save a password

I have an issue with GNOME keyring

default-cache-ttl 600
max-cache-ttl 7200

Also, the following is useful to add to your .bashrc if you are using Yubikey NEO on Ubuntu:

# OpenPGP applet support for YubiKey NEO
if [ ! -f /tmp/gpg-agent.env ]; then
  killall gpg-agent;
  eval $(gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support > /tmp/gpg-agent.env);
. /tmp/gpg-agent.env

Can I import from KeePass, LastPass or X?

Are there more frequently asked questions?

Where can I ask for help?

Read up on recent changes

Linux Compatible Windows 10 Compatible OS X Compatible FreeBSD Compatible